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Abstract Reflecting on Roy Baumeister’s guidelines for
a general theory of motivation, we relate his ideas to our
own perspectives and interests. In those terms we consider,
among others, the role of motivation in cognitive pro-
cesses, the emergence of motives from basic needs, the
mental representation of motives in memory, and the issue
of free will. Roy’s paper compellingly demonstrates the
indispensability of motivation to psychological phenomena
writ large, and it aptly identifies critical junctures where
further motivational research is needed.
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Introduction
Following a relative lull during the 1970s and 1980s
(Higgins 2012) research on motivation is in clear ascen-
dance in diverse domains of psychological science. Moti-
vation occupied the center stage in early dynamic models
of the mind (including psychoanalytic theory), and it was a
mainstay of behaviorist theories of learning and perfor-
mance. The cognitive revolution of the 1960s and 1970s
largely eclipsed the topic of motivation, but in past decades
motivational research has been making a forceful come-
back. Indeed, motivational analyses of affect, cognition,
and action are ubiquitous in the psychological literature
these days. Roy Baumeister’s (2016) masterful essay
explains why, and draws a comprehensive road map for
future work on this indispensible construct. In the present
commentary, we reflect on Roy’s analysis, and react to his
ideas from our own conceptual perspective.
The sovereignty of motivation
Roy aptly highlights the central role of motivation in nearly
all realms of psychological phenomena. Motivation is the
driver of cognition, action, and emotion. This does not
mean that motivation is more important than other psy-
chological topics; no such invidious comparison is implied.
Rather, understanding cognition, affect, or behavior will be
incomplete without taking motivation into account. Con-
sider cognition. William James famously noted that
‘‘Thinking is for doing.’’ It is also true, however, that
‘‘Doing is for Wanting’’; that is, behavior and cognition are
purposive, they are instigated by motivation, we perform
activities because we want to gratify some motive. In
recent years, considerable research revolved around the
amount of thinking that takes place. ‘‘Intuitive’’ thinking
was assumed to be fast whereas ‘‘deliberative’’ thinking—
slow (Kahneman 2011). But the amount of thinking lies on
a continuum that is importantly determined by motivation
(Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011). Under high need for
cognitive closure, for example, the amount of information
processing (that is, thinking) is sparse and individuals
judgments fall prey to primacy effects, or the impact of
accessible schemas and stereotypes. These biases are mit-
igated or avoided under lower need for closure, or under
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the need to avoid closure (Kruglanski and Webster 1996;
Kruglanski et al. 2006; Kruglanski 2004).
The contents of conclusions reached, the end product of
thinking, is also critically determined by motivation, whe-
ther it be the accuracy motivation, or a directional motiva-
tion of some sort, e.g., self enhancement, impression
management, or control motivation. Whether motivated
reasoning will take place (Sinclair and Kunda 1999; Dun-
ning 1999), and whether the desired conclusions will be
reached, may depend on the magnitude of the motivation
involved, strength of the ‘‘reality constraints’’ and the
amount of mental resources at the individual’s disposal
(Kruglanski et al. 2012; Be´langer et al. 2014, 2015). In short,
motivation plays a role in determining both the extent of
thinking and the content of thoughts, two major facets of
cognition. It also plays such a role in shaping remembering
and forgetting, other cognitive phenomena par excellence
(Pica et al. 2013, 2014). Similar cases can bemade for affect,
as Baumeister compellingly argued, and for behavior that
would not occur without a motivational ‘‘push.’’
The origin of motives
Where do human motives come from? According to evo-
lutionary theory, the primary motivational base for
behavior is survival (of individuals and their genes). Sub-
sequent inclinations presumably evolved to serve this
‘‘mother of all motives’’, namely the biological needs of
hunger, thirst, and sex. These in turn give rise to further
motivational propensities designed to gratify them: social
power, aesthetic sophistication, attractive appearance, and
money. Thus, a motivational hierarchy is established
wherein the lower tendencies are means to higher tenden-
cies. Intriguingly, in time those means can become intrin-
sically motivating, acquiring what Gordon Allport called
functional autonomy. Specifically, in Allport’s terms:
‘‘Activities and objects that earlier in the game were means
to an end, now become ends in themselves’’ (Allport 1937,
p. 144). Admittedly, the concept of functional autonomy
has not been directly tested in empirical research. How-
ever, a disjunction that it implies between erstwhile means
and the higher goals these had been one time serving might
well occur on some occasions. Thus, we deem best to treat
it as ‘‘innocent until proven guilty.’’
Whereas the concept of functional autonomy evokes
instrumentality of lower to higher motives as the mecha-
nism of motive-emergence, behavioral learning theorists
(Hull 1943; Mowrer 1956; Skinner 1938) evoke associa-
tion as that mechanism. Thus, secondary reinforcers are
situational features or events (e.g., the sound of a bell) in
which a stimulus prompts (or augments) a behavior after it
had been associated with a primary reinforcer (a basic drive
like hunger, thirst, or sex). A kindred notion is that of
conditioned drives (such as fear, c.f. Mowrer and Solomon
1954) in which a neutral feature of the environment is
paired with a noxious stimulus consequently acquiring
motivating properties of its own (e.g., prompting an escape
response upon its appearance).
However, whereas secondary reinforcers are known to
lose their rewarding properties if the association is severed
between them and the primary reinforcers (defining extinc-
tion), no similar fading of motivational powers is assumed to
characterize functional autonomy. In Allport’s eloquent
terms (1937, p. 146) ‘‘The pursuit of literature, the devel-
opment of good taste in clothes, the use of cosmetics, the
acquiring of an automobile, strolls in the public park, or a
winter in Miami—all may first serve, let us say, the interests
of sex. But every one of these instrumental activities may
become an interest in itself, held for a life time, long after the
erotic motive has been laid away in lavender.’’ Juxtaposing
the concepts of extinction and of functional autonomy begs
the question of the conditions under which each may occur.
This poses a challenge for the general theory of motivation
on the fundamental matter of motive development.
Why might extinction occur in some instances yet not in
others? A candidate hypothesis is awareness that the
acquired drive no longer serves or is associated with the
primary motive. A hint in this direction comes from
avoidance learning, known to be highly resistant to
extinction. For instance, when placed in the shuttle-box
animals learn that they receive a shock at the end of the
tone if they do not shuttle away from a compartment, and
that they do not receive a shock if they do shuttle. As a
consequence, they almost always shuttle before the tone
has reached its end. When the shocker is disconnected, they
have little opportunity to learn that the previous contin-
gency between shuttling and shock-omission has changed.
Tone-in-the-absence-of-shuttling still signals shock and,
just as before, after a shuttle the tone ends and no shock
follows. Thus, from the animal’s perspective, nothing has
changed, the relation between the tone and the shock was
not broken, so avoidance behavior continues.
Avoidance learning represents the case where the asso-
ciation between a secondary drive (like fear elicited by a
tone) and the primary drive (avoidance of painful shock) is
presumably maintained in the subject’s awareness albeit
not in reality. Another possible mechanism of maintaining
the secondary motive despite the severance of its actual
association with the primary motive is forgetting that the
former actually was connected to the latter. This possibility
is implicit in Freud’s notion that current symptoms may
have developed as (dysfunctional) solutions to prior psy-
cho-sexual conflicts that have long since ceased to exist. As
Freud put it, ‘‘neuroses in general are an expression of
disturbances in sexual life…[with] the psycho-neuroses
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[being] the consequences of bygone injuries’’ (Freud 1922/
1955, p. 47). Be that however it may, the mechanisms of
motive-development aren’t fully understood at this time;
research on these matters opens intriguing space for future
explorations and extends opportunities for exciting new
discoveries in motivation science.
Latent and effective motives
Baumeister’s distinction between the ‘‘drive’’ and the
‘‘impulse’’ aspects raises intriguing issues. Drive represents
a latent motivation. It constitutes a potential that needs to
be activated and translated into actionable impulse afforded
by situational circumstances. The drive-impulse dichotomy
begs the question how motivational constructs are mapped
in memory: Is it the fundamental survival drive that forms
the latent motivation, an entire motivational hierarchy that
is latent? Or perhaps a small subpart of the hierarchy that is
activated by the psychological situation? Say, a person
decides to fill out a college application on a given after-
noon. What exactly prompted this particular ‘‘impulse’’?
Was it the goal of attending college primed by notice of the
submission deadline? Was it the motive for social approval
that a college degree would fulfill? Or the basic need for
survival and procreation that social approval may facili-
tate? How can we decide which it was? And what differ-
ence would that make for the undertaken action? These
questions too could be profitably addressed in subsequent
research.
How free is the will?
The issue of free will that Roy raises bears an intimate
relation to the concept of motivation. To be free (or, per-
haps, to feel free) is to do what one wants, that is to gratify
one’s currently dominant goals. One freely decides to
consume ice cream, go on vacation, or to bed at night
because these are things one wants to do at a given
moment. Of course, what one wants is predetermined: it
follows from the systematic evolution of motives cascading
from instincts of survival and procreation, to various meso-
level goals (e.g., for achievement or approval) on to the
momentary impulses that drive behavior. In that sense (felt)
freedom (or ‘‘doing what one wants’’) is quite compatible
with determinism. The fly in this ointment is this, however.
That, after all, one always does what one wants; our
behavior is perennially motivated by one goal or another.
How does one then account for the occasional feeling of
compulsion we all experience? A possible answer is that
our (experienced) freedom is constrained by goal conflict;
the greater the conflict the greater the compulsion, because
rejecting an attractive alternative is not what one really
wants. Consider yielding one’s wallet to a bandit; on the
one hand, by doing so one saves one’s life, which is clearly
what one wants; yet on the other one does not want to part
with one’s money, nor does one want to be overpowered
and humiliated by a bully. It is arguably the latter aspect
that produce the feeling of compulsion.
Possibly, also, there could exist an asymmetry here
between choosing to remove what one does not want (what
Higgins 2012, referred to as a prevention focus) and
choosing to pursue what one wants (Higgins’ promotion
focus). There could exist a psychological neutral ground on
which positive side were things one wanted and on which
negative side were things one did not want. The greater the
positive deviation, that is, the stronger the want, the greater
the experience of freedom; the greater the negative devi-
ation, the stronger the aversion that one tried to eliminate
the greater the sense of compulsion. These issues have
recently been investigated by Lau et al. (2015), who indeed
showed that subjective freedom was higher when people
chose between positive outcomes than between negative
outcomes. Presumably, in the former case individuals at
least were doing something they wanted to do, which was
not so in the latter case. These matters deserve further
exploration.
Liking versus wanting
Baumeister’s plea to explicate the relation between liking
and wanting is one we anticipated in a recent paper
(Kruglanski et al. 2015). We agreed with researchers who
argued that liking is not tantamount to wanting (c.f.,
Bagozzi 1992; Berridge 2004). In fact, liking for an object
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for wanting
it. It is insufficient because one might like what one pos-
sesses already so that liking for that object may not pro-
duce wanting. Moreover, liking for something in the
absolute isn’t a necessary condition for wanting it, because
one may prefer an undesirable state (that one generally
dislikes) over an even less undesirable state (the lesser evil
as it were). For instance, a refugee may strive to leave
one’s homeland and flee to a foreign country even though
she may not particularly like being there, because staying
behind would be dangerous for herself and her family.
To be sure, liking is not irrelevant to wanting. ‘‘Want-
ing’’ refers to greater (approach) or lesser (avoidance)
liking for a possible future state relative to the current
state. That is, wanting appears when the anticipated
assessment (like or dislike) for the future state is either
more or less positive than that of the current state. Thus,
wanting arises from a discrepancy between liking for the
present versus the future state. The motivating properties of
Motiv Emot (2016) 40:11–15 13
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discrepancy are highlighted in major psychological theo-
ries of motivation (c.f., Carver and Scheier 1982, 1990;
Custers and Aarts 2005, 2007; Higgins 1987; Miller et al.
1960; Oettingen et al. 2001; Weiner 1980).
We finally assume that a discrepancy in liking between a
present and a future state needs to reach above a certain
threshold of magnitude to translate into wanting. Minute
discrepancies in liking, say, slightly lesser liking for
sleeping in versus exercising at the gym, may not neces-
sarily result in positively wanting to do the latter.
On plants and robots
Baumeister view of motivation ties it uniquely to the ani-
mal kingdom and excludes it from plants (at one end) and
machines (robots) (at the other). Yet it may be alleged that
no process occurs without a cause; in a broad sense such
cause constitutes the motivation that sets the processes
going. Processes occur in plants and machines, hence, both
must contain a semblance of motivation. Consider plants,
for instance. These have various needs, and in this sense
are motivated. They need water, light, minerals, etc.
Moreover, even plants act on the environment in some
ways; they ‘‘assess’’ it and ‘‘locomote’’ to unique ends as
Darwin (1880) showed with his work on plants’ power of
movement. Roots, for example, grow toward the dark and
toward moisture, and tendrils move in circular motion,
assessing the space around them until they find something
to which they can cling. Unicellar organisms, not quite
describable as animals, also appear motivated by their
needs. An amoeba moves its pseudopodia to assess the
environment and then continues moving or stops, depend-
ing on what it encounters. This is also true of bacteria that
sense gradients in heat, salinity, or humidity in the envi-
ronment. Thus, the fundamental principle of motivation
whereby needs instigate actions in service of those needs is
actually present in all living things from plants onward.
At the other end, one could envisage that robots too
might be equipped with ‘‘motivations.’’ The simple ther-
mostat illustrates the principle as Miller et al.’s (1960)
noted in their TOTE (Test, Operate, Test Exit) model. The
thermostat defines a given ambient temperature as the set
points departures from which ‘‘motivate’’ an activation of a
heating or cooling mechanism designed to bring it back to
the preset value. In the same way, robots could be equipped
with thermostat-like sensors capable of detecting say
whether, say, they are in contact with other people or
machines (affiliation motivation), whether they succeed on
various tasks (achievement motivation), or whether they do
better than humans or other robots on various assignments
(competitive motivation); departure from predetermined
set points in these regards may then ‘‘motivate’’ various
preprogrammed activities designed to increase the likeli-
hood of success (e.g. practice, learning, etc.). The principle
of motivation as the instigator of activities is truly general,
and in this sense is unrestricted to action of any given kind
or by any given entity.
Getting begetting wanting
Roy’s ‘‘getting begets wanting’’ hypothesis is provocative
and intriguing. Questions of mediators and moderators
immediately spring to mind. Why might getting increase
wanting in the first place? And what are the limiting con-
ditions of this phenomenon? One thing that getting pre-
sumably does is increase the expectancy that the object of
one’s desire is attainable. This, in turn, may increase the
readiness to adopt a goal of obtaining the object in question
(Kruglanski et al. 2012) and in that sense augment the
commitment to it (hence, a sense of wanting). It follows
that if the expectancy was high to begin with, increased
‘‘getting’’ would have a diminishing impact on wanting.
For instance, buying groceries at one’s local store should
have little impact on wanting them as their expectancy of
attainment was at its maximum already.
Moreover, getting can also have contrary effects on
wanting: Increased likelihood of getting something can
reduce the challenge of its attainment and thus decrease its
value and reduce wanting. Along similar lines, a (chronic
or situational) variety-seeking motivation may reduce the
subjective value of things already obtained and prompt the
quest for other ‘‘greener pastures.’’ Thus, when variety
seeking is at a premium, getting might undermine rather
than beget wanting. Individual differences may also come
into play: in our own research, we find that individuals who
are dispositionally low on the tendency to maintain com-
mitment are less likely to exhibit the endowment effect
(i.e., value an item they already own), even when the item
they possess is relevant to their current goals (Jasko et al.
2015).
Concluding comment
As the foregoing discussion attests, Roy Baumeister’s
essay serves as an inspiring goad to deliberation about and
careful examination of the crucial construct of motivation.
Baumeister charts out the territory for future research in
this domain and identifies major problem areas where
further investigations are needed. Given the centrality of
motivation to all psychological phenomena and its poten-
tial to address a vast variety of societal concerns, intensive
work in motivation science, guided by Roy’s imaginative
‘‘road map,’’ seem highly worthwhile and timely.
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